At this point, I’m well aware that I tend to sound like an old crank when reviewing class action scholarship; much of it repeats the same old stuff, predicts the imminent demise of the class action in its current form, and looks at the same Supreme Court cases instead of digging into where the real action happens. And that is why I am happy to report that this year, there were quite a few articles that did take different approaches to various problems in class actions. Yes, we still had some of the same Supreme Court rehashes, but even some … Continue Reading
Plaintiff and defense lawyers tend to talk past each other a lot when discussing the legal theories underlying the class action. Plaintiffs talk of deterrence, and the need for easier certification requirements. Defendants talk about potential abuses of the device, and the need for due process. Plaintiffs prefer the "entity theory" of class actions. Defendants prefer the "joinder" theory. So to find academics on either side agreeing to anything substantive can be quite rare.
And that’s why it is notable that two law professors–from different ends of the spectrum–are now arguing that courts should look at class actions as trusts… Continue Reading
The adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) tends to be under-studied and under-enforced. That’s why it is always a pleasure to read new work on adequacy. Now, Professor Elizabeth Burch has published her latest discussion of the adequacy requirement: Adequately Representing Groups.
Professor Burch focuses on the standard that should apply when attacking adequacy after the fact. Nonetheless, this inquiry should inform the Rule 23(a)(4) inquiry, since one of the purposes of finding a representative adequate is to prevent subsequent collateral attacks to an aggregated judgment.
- Courts should tolerate greater conflicts in "indivisible remedy" cases.
In 1998, the class action plaintiffs’ firm Milberg Weiss filed sued Computer Associates for violating the federal securities laws by lying about its revenues in order to increase its stock price. In a perfectly unremarkable development, it was appointed co-lead counsel of the consolidated class. (Various firms had filed a total of eleven complaints.) Over the next four years, the pressure on Computer Associates mounted. Thirteen more complaints were filed, and the US Attorney’s office (EDNY) and SEC launched a joint investigation of the firm.
So Computer Associates decided to settle the case. After seven months of mediation with … Continue Reading
Last week, there were two appellate opinions, one from the Seventh Circuit and one from the Tenth, that are worth some attention. They’re worth discussing together as well, because while only one is really helpful for defendants, both discuss different conceptions of how to argue comity in class actions.
The first is Smentek v. Dart (7th Cir. 2012). Smentek was a class action filed on behalf of Illinois prisoners who had been denied dental care in violation of the due process clause. It was the third of its kind. How did that happen? In the first two class actions, various … Continue Reading
For those unfamiliar with Ronald Coase, he is the 101-year-old Nobel Laureate who laid a number of the foundations for law and economics when he published his Nature of the Firm (which explained why people would use corporate forms instead of just contracts) and Problem of Social Cost (which explained why law should seek to minimize transaction costs).
In 1988, Professor Coase turned his formidable intellect to another question that had vexed legal scholars for some time: why is blackmail illegal? As Professor Coase pointed out, the central paradox of blackmail is that it makes it illegal to … Continue Reading
This was a busy year for class-action jurisprudence. Clearly, most of the Supreme Court cases had some effect on class action practice. But the district and appellate courts also rendered a host of rulings this year that significantly affect class-action practice. Despite what a number of academics and plaintiffs’ lawyers have claimed, the class action is not dead. That said, it’s probably true, to quote plaintiff’s lawyer Daniel Girard, that while the "death of the class action" is overstated, the "Golden Age of the private attorney-general" is over. There were so many interesting opinions in the past year, … Continue Reading
Earlier today, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Smith v. Bayer Corp. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Kagan, it held that a federal court cannot enjoin a state court from re-litigating a class action that had been denied certification in federal court. In doing so, it barred a tactic that defense lawyers had been using for some time: invoking the Anti-Injunction Act to bar state-court relitigation of class actions. And defense lawyers sighed and began to slump their shoulders like Charlie Brown …
… which, as it turns out, is not necessary. Because while the … Continue Reading
As both plaintiffs and defendants get more sophisticated, the problem of how to litigate mass torts grows more complicated. In particular, both litigants and courts struggle with the question of when a verdict should have preclusive effect in mass tort litigation, and when it should not. Before he passed away last year, Vanderbilt law professor Richard Nagareda made some progress on this question in Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, an article for the Cornell Law Review. As Nagareda put it:
… Continue Reading
Each instance involves what this Article labels as a situation of “embedded aggregation.” In each, a doctrinal feature
Late last year, the Eleventh Circuit ruled on the preclusive effect of a state-certified class action in federal court. The Federalist Society very kindly asked me to comment on it for their online journal Engage. It turned out to be a really interesting project, because what started out as an opinion about preclusion turned out to be more about the nature of commonality. Here’s a quick preview of the argument:
… Continue Reading
While at first glance Brown addresses the preclusive effect of the Engle class action, the real question the Eleventh Circuit wrestled with was the scope of Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance