Betting the Company: Complex Negotiation Strategies for Law & Business

Yesterday, I received my author's copy of Betting the Company: Complex Negotiation Strategies for Law & Business, which I wrote with old friend Andrew DeGuire of Johnson Controls, Inc. We've been informed that Amazon is now shipping orders (a month earlier than expected).

So today's post is a brief excerpt, to let you all know what we've been working on for the last eighteen months.

Throughout this book, we use “complex negotiations” to mean negotiations with (or among) organizations. Why? Because nego- tiations between organizations have a number of characteristics that may place them on the complex end of any spectrum. There are six characteristics of complex negotiations, each of which presents itself most visibly in negotiations between organizations.

 

* Complex negotiations amplify the effect of nonrational judgments. Individual negotiations involve nonrational components and strong personalities. For various reasons we will explain in greater depth, these nonrational judgments are more frequent (and more severe) in organizations than among individuals.
* Complex negotiations also involve multiple parties. Even if the negotiation is only one organization negotiating with another, the negotiation will likely be handled by teams, and those teams will represent constituents that must be mollified.
* Complex negotiations involve multiple issues. Negotiations over a single issue depend on the amount of bargaining power each party has. By contrast, negotiations over multiple issues provide greater opportunities for agreement (where concessions on one issue can be traded against gains on other issues) or deadlock (by providing additional areas for distrust or disagreement).
* Complex negotiations take place over an extended period of time. When negotiations take place over a course of months or years, the parties develop relationships that affect the nature of the exchange.
* Complex negotiations are heavily regulated. They occur against a background of complex rules and laws. They may also occur against a background of organizational rules.
* Complex negotiations are intercultural. Each organization has its own culture. And negotiations that cross international boundaries may involve different national cultures as well.


Of course, many of these characteristics occur even in “simple” negotiations. It is possible for negotiations between individuals to involve nonrational components, third parties, multiple issues, or culture clashes. However, as explained in greater detail later in this book, because of the ways in which members of groups interact with each other, these issues are more likely to arise in the context of negotiations between organizations.

One central irony we will discuss throughout this book is that organizations are extremely helpful with complex issues: they allow us to throw more resources at a problem; they check individual personality quirks that might lead us astray; and they allow us to add expertise on new issues when necessary. But at the same time as they solve some challenges, organizations intensify others: organizations multiply the number of people who must be satisfied with the outcome; they lengthen the time required to consummate a deal, allowing new events to intervene; they can even amplify undesirable personality traits and entrench them as corporate culture.
In short, complex negotiations mean lots of moving parts, which in turn means lots of distractions and lots of chances to knock a negotiating team off its original plan. So one of the things this book is about is how to maintain strategic focus when events are exploding around you.

While I hope the connection with class-action practice will be self-evident, this book represented a departure from the doctrinal analysis so many of us lawyers spend so much time on. I'm proud of the result, and hope some of you will find it useful.

Reverse Auctions, Motions to Stay, and Legal Realism: Branca v. Iovate Health Sciences USA, Inc.

 Two plaintiffs' firms filed nearly identical class actions against a dietary supplement company, alleging that one of its weight loss supplement didn't work. The cases were filed within two weeks of each other, one in federal court (Branca v. Iovate Health Sciences USA, Inc.), and one in California state court (Garcia v. Iovate Health Sciences USA, Inc.). Shortly thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to stay in the federal case, because it had settled the case in state court.

So far, this was all just run-of-the-mill procedural maneuvering. So why make it the subject of a blog post? As the court explained:

Why not stay this case, if one that's virtually identical to it, and would resolve all of the claims, has reached a preliminary settlement that is now awaiting court approval? The real reason, according to Branca, is that the Garcia settlement is collusive, or at least looks really bad.

(Italics in original; bold emphasis added.)  The part that "look[ed] really bad" was that the firm representing the defendant had been about to engage in mediation with opposing counsel when the Garcia case was filed. The opinion implies (but does not state outright) that the quick settlement in the Garcia case might be the result of a reverse auction.

The Court has read the parties' briefs and given considerable thought to them. Here's the basic problem: No matter how hard Iovate tries to argue that a stay is warranted under Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S. Ct. 163, 81 L. Ed. 153 (1936), and no matter how hard Branca tries to argue back that a stay isn't warranted under Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976), the real fight here is for control of a class action between two warring plaintiffs' firms. That fight, moreover, is inseparable from the ostensibly disinterested legal arguments they make for the Court staying or not staying this case.

But, having identified the real stakes of the motion to stay, the court decided to grant it anyway.

The Court's view is that if there's something procedurally or substantively unsavory about the Garcia settlement, even though it appears to be the result of vigorous bargaining before an experienced mediator, Judge de Bellefeuille should be the judge to say so. Garcia is her case. But until Judge de Bellefeuille makes that call, and meaningfully stalls the progress of the Garcia settlement, the Court is inclined to exercise its discretionary power under Landis to stay this case in the interest of judicial economy.

The case is notable because it's not often that a court will pull back the curtain to expose the real interests behind a mundane procedural motion. That kind of realism is always worth a second look. And the takeaway for defense lawyers is one that always bears repeating: don't be afraid of telling the court what's really going on. Courts are often more willing to wave aside legal fictions than we might think.

Empirical Evidence of the Importance of the MTD in Securities Cases

Back in January, NERA Economic Consulting published yet another interesting paper, entitled Dynamic Litigation Analysis: Predicting Securities Class Action Settlements as a Case Evolves, by Dr. Ronald Miller.

Using the data NERA has collected on securities class actions over 20 years, Dr. Miller comes to some interesting conclusions about motions practice in securities cases. Most notably:

 

  • Few securities class actions are resolved at the summary judgment stage.
  • The filing of a motion to dismiss has little effect on settlement value of securities cases, but the granting of dismissal can reduce the value of a settlement by up to 40%. (Why not 100%? Presumably because class actions that settle after a successful motion to dismiss involved multiple lawsuits, or some other threat of recurrent litigation.)
  • The resolution of a motion for class certification (either pro or con) does not have a statistically significant effect on settlement value, but the mere filing of the certification motion drives up settlement value by about 33%.

These findings reinforce an intuition (backed by experience) that many securities class action lawyers share: unlike in other class actions where certification is the real battle, in securities class actions, the real fight is the motion to dismiss.

A few brief lessons ...

 ... from November's cases so far:

  • CAFA has not changed the rule that a counterclaim cannot confer federal jurisdiction.  Resurgent Capital Servs., LP v. Thomason, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (W.D. Mo. Nov. 5, 2012) (remanding case).
  • Courts get suspicious when parties widen the scope of a class action during settlement negotiations.  Smith v. Levine Leichtman Capital Partners, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163672 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012) (denying approval of settlement).
  • If you're going to settle a class action, you still need a workable class definition.  Supler v. FKAACS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159210 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 6, 2012) (denying preliminary approval of settlement).

 

Adequacy of Counsel, Attorneys' Fees, and Malpractice - Wyly v Weiss

In 1998, the class action plaintiffs' firm Milberg Weiss filed sued Computer Associates for violating the federal securities laws by lying about its revenues in order to increase its stock price. In a perfectly unremarkable development, it was appointed co-lead counsel of the consolidated class. (Various firms had filed a total of eleven complaints.) Over the next four years, the pressure on Computer Associates mounted. Thirteen more complaints were filed, and the US Attorney's office (EDNY) and SEC launched a joint investigation of the firm.

So Computer Associates decided to settle the case. After seven months of mediation with the plaintiffs, it announced a settlement where class members would receive 5.7 million shares of stock in the company, then valued at around $140 million. Counsel's fee was 1.4 million shares, valued at approximately $35 million. (One might ask whether a settlement like this either (1) counts as a coupon settlement, or (2) created problems by diluting current shares, but neither of those was raise by the parties, who were all interested in the settlement going through.) By the end of 2003, the court had approved the settlement; there were no objectors.

Four months later, several Computer Associates executives pled guilty to conspiracy to commit securities fraud and obstruction of justice; the firm admitted that its executives had engaged in a multi-billion dollar fraud and coverup, and it restated an additional $2.2 billion in earnings. In addition, the Wall Street Journal reported that Computer Associates had withheld 23 boxes of documents during class-action discovery.

At this point, several of the class-action plaintiffs asked Milberg Weiss to vacate the certification order under Rule 60(b), because they had been deprived of essential information in the 23 boxes. Milberg Weiss declined to do so. So the plaintiffs proceeded on their own. After three years of litigation and discovery, the court dismissed the Rule 60(b) motion, in part because it wished to protect the "finality which a settlement is intended to produce." (It also noted that these plaintiffs had not objected to the settlement at the time.)

At that point, the disgruntled class members filed a malpractice action against Milberg Weiss and others in New York state court, alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. The lawyer-defendants responded by asking the E.D.N.Y. for an injunction against the malpractice action under the All Writs Act and Anti-Injunction Act, defending the settlement approval and the dismissal of the 60(b) motion. The E.D.N.Y. issued the injunction, and the plaintiffs appealed.

Which brings us to this week's case, Wyly v. Milberg, in which the Second Circuit affirmed the injunction. For those interested in the minutiae of the All Writs Act and Anti-Injunction Act, the court held that it could not uphold the injunction under the "in aid of jurisdiction" prong of the All Writs Act, because the court lacked in personam jurisdiction, and the mere connection with a class action was not enough to invoke any of the known exceptions to that rule:

We have never held that a district court's involvement in complex litigation justifies, without more, issuance of an injunction "in aid of" the court's jurisdiction, and we decline to create such a rule here.

Instead, the Second Circuit turned to the "relitigation" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, which required it to conduct a preclusion analysis of the malpractice case. After determining that res judicata (claim preclusion) did not apply, it reasoned that

Before applying the elements of issue preclusion to this case, we begin with a preliminary observation about the Appellees' argument. In the course of the federal class action litigation, the District Court did not "actually decide" whether the Appellees committed legal malpractice; that claim was not presented, and therefore the Court had no reason to address malpractice as such. The Appellees' issue-preclusion argument is focused not on whether the District Court previously adjudicated a malpractice claim, however, but on whether the Court resolved one of the elements of a malpractice claim--namely, counsel's deficient performance.

(Emphasis in original.)  And it found that the Settlement Order had in fact established that the attorneys had acted in a reasonable manner, precluding a finding that could establish malpractice.

The Settlement Order held, inter alia, that the global settlement of the 1998 and 2002 class actions was "fair, reasonable[,] and adequate," and that class counsel was entitled to an award of fees that the District Court found to be "fair and reasonable." Whether an award of "fair and reasonable" attorneys' fees necessarily decides the deficient-performance prong of a legal malpractice claim is an issue of first impression in this Circuit. We conclude that the deficient-performance prong of New York's legal malpractice rule is identical to the reasonable-performance issue that the District Court decided as a necessary component of the Settlement Order.

(Internal footnote omitted.)  Since the lower court had found counsel to be adequate, and had also found that its performance merited its requested fee, there was no way another court could find that counsel had committed malpractice.

It is possible that the circumstances that gave rise to this case may come up again sometime. But that's not the reason for defense lawyers to focus on it. (After all, here, the defense had pulled off a coup: settling the case for less than it might be worth after the conclusion of a criminal investigation.) Instead, here are four other reasons this case is important for defense lawyers:

  1. The full record is fascinating reading, and offers a lot of between-the-lines looks at how a large securities plaintiff's firm operates.
  2. The Second Circuit's "relitigation" reasoning may have application in other cases where plaintiffs seek a second bite at the apple in state court. Defendants are often interested in finality, and this is a case that offers some help in achieving that in litigation.
  3. We often talk about how plaintiffs in class actions are only nominal, and it is the attorneys who really run the cases.  This case is a stark example of just what that divorce between plaintiff and attorney can mean in a class action.
  4. The case is an important reminder that if you do not challenge adequacy of counsel or the level of attorneys' fees when they first arise, you may be precluded from doing so later, when it really matters.

The Other Trends in the Mid-Year NERA Report

Last week, NERA Economic Consulting released its latest mid-year report on trends in class-action securities filings. The trend most are mentioning is the decline in the pace of securities settlements, coupled with the fact that settlement amounts remain high. But there are a number of other interesting observations that are worth mentioning. Among them:

Of the cases that settled, 90% had a motion to dismiss filed and 42% had motion for class certification filed.

(Emphasis added.) This makes a degree of sense. A failed motion to dismiss would help the defendant to understand whether a legal theory has merit (or, at least, whether a court will allow a plaintiff to run with a theory others might not). Moeover, the motion to dismiss remains a critical filing in securities class action litigation.  While it would be interesting to know how many of those motions for class certification were granted, it is useful to know that slightly fewer than half of the settled cases at least got as far as seeing what plaintiffs' certification theory was. (Securities class actions, of course, often face fewer individualized issues than other class actions.)

The report also notes that merger objection class actions (which had long found homes in Delaware state court) are growing in federal court.

There continued to be a relatively large number of merger and acquisition objection cases (merger objection cases) in recent years. Merger objection cases first represented an important component of federal filings in 2010, when they amounted to 31% of filings..

And the report also observes that forum-shopping remains a common tactic in class-action filings:

"Filings remain concentrated in two circuits: the Second (encompassing New York, Connecticut, and Vermont), and the Ninth (including California, Washington, and certain other Western states and territories). However, in the first half of 2012 the balance between these two circuits was substantially different from that in previous years.

During the first half of this year, filings in the Second Circuit have been made at a higher pace than in any recent year except 2008. Filings in the Ninth Circuit, by contrast, have decreased substantially. At their current pace, there will be only 30 filings in the Ninth Circuit this year, which would be the lowest total since the passage of the PSLRA in 1995."

The decline in Ninth Circuit filings is probably due to a combination of the fallout from Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, and the recent ruling in Mazza v. American Honda Co., which held that plaintiffs could not file nationwide class actions based solely on California law. While neither of these two holdings has a direct effect on securities class actions, it's been my unscientific impression that the various California district courts in particular have responded by clamping down on class actions in general; it would make sense that plaintiffs might decide to begin filing elsewhere under those circumstances. Nonetheless, it is clear that plaintiffs still far prefer to file in the Second and Ninth Circuits when possible. (Some of this might stem from the fact that the more favorable environment means that the plaintiffs' bar in these two areas is more developed.)

So what's the takeaway from these trends? Plaintiffs remain innovative, and class actions remain far from dead.

Class Action Summer Camp - Adequacy

The adequacy requirement tends to be much-analyzed, but--at least from a defense perspective--wildly under-enforced. As Dean Robert Klonoff recently wrote, one reason for this may be that it is so difficult for class counsel to actually identify plaintiffs that can serve as adequate class representatives. But, as a result, there are numerous cases that challenge class actions where the named plaintiffs serve as little more than stand-ins for their counsel, rather than exercising any independent judgment. Adequacy is a particularly important doctrine because it has due process implications, and because it comes up in class settlements and in later fights over the preclusive effects of previous class actions. So don't expect the debate to stop any time soon.

Ten Cases to Educate You

 

Further Reading:

Questions to Consider:

  • What conflicts will courts hold are signs of inadequate representation?
  • What degree of independence should a plaintiff be able to display? Is there any way to test that without invading the attorney-client privilege?
  • If courts are unwilling to enforce the adequacy requirement stringently, what other methods exist for ensuring that class actions are adequately governed?

More on Using State AG Settlements

The nice folks at E-Commerce Law Reports have just published an article by yours truly on using settlements with state attorneys general or other government agencies to reduce one's class action liability.  You can find it here.  

Negotiation Studies - Bargaining and Learning While Fighting

Most articles about negotiation or settlement treat conflict not just as something to be avoided, but as a complete breakdown in the negotiation process. Either conflict represents a massive miscalculation (as law-and-economics scholars have said about litigation, and international security scholars say about war), or it represents a best alternative to negotiation for one party.

But there is another option, one that Professor Robert Powell recognized back in 2004. As he discussed in his article "Bargaining and Learning While Fighting," conflict (for his area of study war, for ours litigation) can operate as an information-gathering device.

How does this differ from the standard economic model of bargaining? In the standard model, you have a buyer and a seller, and some private information (the true value of the object to the buyer). The buyer has an incentive to hide the true value, and the only real indication of the true value of the object is the buyer's willingness to keep negotiating or walk away.

In conflict, however, there's another source of private information (the distribution of power), and another way of learning about it (the fighting). Fighting will reveal some information that's not as prone to strategic manipulation. For example, actual litigation will reveal one's resolve to litigate, as well as provide some idea of the resources one has at his disposal.

The model Powell proposes is the following. There is a satisfied party (let's call them the defendant for our purposes) and a dissatisfied party (the plaintiff). The dissatisfied party registers a complaint or a threat, and the satisfied party makes an offer. The more the defendant concedes, the more likely there will be a settlement without a fight, but the worse the terms for the defendant. If the plaintiff rejects the offer, then there is conflict. But the bargaining doesn't have to end there. Instead, at the end of each round of conflict (here, those might be when motions are decided or discovery is released), each side knows a little more about the other side's capabilities, and about the likely outcome of the conflict.

Thus, the bargaining continues until the states reach agreement or until one of the states runs out of resources.

Powell goes on to explain that while, in the standard model of negotiation, there's really only one source of uncertainty (the price of the object), in negotiation that leads to conflict, there are two. One is the price (which he refers to as costs or resolve). But there's also uncertainty over the distribution of power, which will dictate who wins the conflict. (For lawyers, this can be any number of things: the state of the law, the relative talent for each firm, the resources available to each firm, even the rhetorical advantage for each position.) And, as Powell points out, this difference in types of uncertainty

suggests that crises arising out of uncertainty over costs or resolve are likely to be settled more quickly and short of large scale fighting than are crises arising out of uncertainty over the distribution of power.

Powell's conclusion requires one tweak when discussing litigation. Class-action lawyers, unlike generals, face an ethical duty to represent their clients. As a result, once a class-action lawyer files a lawsuit, he often faces additional pressure to keep the conflict going unless he can settle on terms favorable to the class. (There's likely political pressure to do this in war, but not the same worry about one's professional license.)

So, how can defendants use Powell's work to their advantage? Powell's article confirms one important feature of litigation that I have been discussion for some time: every action taken in litigation leaks information. And bargaining, even hostile bargaining between two parties locked in conflict, is primarily an exchange of information. So for litigators who continue to keep negotiation open as a strategy, it is important to watch how their opponents are actually fighting the case: doing so can provide vital information about what kinds of offers they might entertain, and which ones they are certain to reject.

 

Sullivan v. DB Investments - The Third Circuit Takes on the Supreme Court (and Itself)

Just before the Christmas holiday, the Third Circuit (meeting en banc) issued an opinion approving a classwide settlement in an antitrust case. The en banc opinion is unusual. (Any en banc opinion is.) But in this case, the opinion is unusual not just because it represents a break from routine, but because of how it reaches its result.

The case is Sullivan v. DB Investments, the culmination of litigation against South African diamond giant De Beers. The primary allegation in the underlying lawsuit was that De Beers had exploited its market dominance to inflate the price of rough diamonds, which would inflate the price of diamonds down the line. De Beers got sued by both direct purchasers and indirect purchasers (in this case: jewelers, other middlemen, and consumers).

The case was not really litigated. De Beers suffered a default judgment because it refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the US courts. It then negotiated a classwide settlement with the plaintiffs' counsel.

The district court approved the settlement, despite the fact that the settlement implicated the antitrust laws of 50 states. (Many state antitrust laws do not allow indirect purchasers to recover for antitrust claims.) Several objectors appealed, arguing that the settlement could not be fair if it allowed people without a legal claim to recover the same amounts as class members who did have solid legal claims. A split panel of the Third Circuit reversed the trial court. Then an en banc panel vacated that opinion and granted an en banc rehearing.

The result was Sullivan. On the surface, the holding (approving a classwide settlement that includes people without a legal claim) may seem unusual, but the fact that the court was approving a settlement class might explain its willingness to overlook the fact that many of the class members would not have been entitled to recover if they had brought their claims in the courts of their home states.

The en banc panel's justification of that holding was more adventurous however, and it has led to some pronouncements that frankly, are just--well, bizarre is the best way to put it. In particular, Sullivan makes a number of statements that flat-out disagree with the Supreme Court's class-action jurisprudence, most notably its definitive statement on class-action settlements Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor. Among those statements:

Variations in state law that are outcome-determinative do not predominate over common issues:

the objectors argue that the existence of substantive variations in the state antitrust laws underlying the Indirect Purchaser damages claims should preclude a court from finding that common issues affecting the class as a whole predominate. They also urge that differences among state consumer protection and unjust enrichment laws would likewise preclude a finding of predominance. Our dissenting colleagues focus on this issue as well, and adopt a specific requirement that every class member has “some colorable legal claim” in order for a district court to certify a class. In our view, this requirement would result in a radical departure from what Rule 23 envisions and what our precedent demands, and it founders for many reasons.

(Emphasis added, internal citations omitted.) The Fifth Circuit disagrees, as does the Second. And so did the Third Circuit in Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc. (which became Amchem).

Predominance focuses only on defendant's conduct:

Our precedent provides that the focus of the predominance inquiry is on whether the defendant’s conduct was common as to all of the class members, and whether all of the class members were harmed by the defendant’s conduct.

The Supreme Court disagreed in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. And to see the extent of that disagreement, here is Justice Ginsburg's characterization of that very issue from her dissent:

The Court gives no credence to the key dispute common to the class: whether Wal-Mart's discretionary pay and promotion policies are discriminatory. "What matters," the Court asserts, "is not the raising of common 'questions,'" but whether there are "[d]issimilarities within the proposed class" that "have the potential to impede the generation of common answers." … The Court's emphasis on differences between class members mimics the Rule 23(b)(3) inquiry into whether common questions "predominate" over individual issues.

(Emphases added, internal citations omitted.)  In short, while Justice Ginsburg disagreed that the commonality requirement should focus on dissimilarities within the class (as opposed to defendant's conduct), she (and her three dissenting colleagues) took it as read that the predominance inquiry did look at dissimilarities.

Courts should not look at whether class claims could survive a motion to dismiss:

An analysis into the legal viability of asserted claims is properly considered through a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) or summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, not as part of a Rule 23 certification process.

and

Class certification and motions to dismiss involve two distinct (and different) standards, and the former does not permit as extensive an inquiry into the merits as the latter does.

(Emphasis added.)  Compare the Supreme Court's holding in Amchem:

The predominance requirement stated in Rule 23(b)(3), we hold, is not met by the factors on which the District Court relied. The benefits asbestos-exposed persons might gain from the establishment of a grand-scale compensation scheme is a matter fit for legislative consideration, but it is not pertinent to the predominance inquiry. That inquiry trains on the legal or factual questions that qualify each class member's case as a genuine controversy, questions that preexist any settlement.

(Emphasis added.)

Choice-of-law inquiries are not appropriate for class certification:

Moreover, district courts undertaking the scrupulous review of state laws could not ensure the validity of each individual claim without first settling upon the precise state law governing each of the putative class members’ claims. This choice-of-law analysis would be particularly difficult in a nationwide class action where an array of factors beyond the residence of the class members must be considered, including, inter alia, the location of the parties and the purchased items, and the place of contracting and performance. See generally Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 467 (3d Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit rightly noted that “choice-of-law issues in nationwide class actions are rarely so uncomplicated that one can delineate clear winning and losing arguments at an early stage in the litigation”; “the legal uncertainty resulting from the complicated choice-of-law issues” would unduly complicate the process for establishing predominance under Rule 23. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 450 F.3d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 2006). As a result, many courts find it “inappropriate to decide choice of law issues incident to a motion for class certification.”

(Emphasis added)  The Supreme Court clearly disagreed with this premise in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts (which, oddly, the Third Circuit did not cite). To wit:

the [choice-of-law] calculus is not altered by the fact that it may be more difficult or more burdensome to comply with the constitutional limitations because of the large number of transactions ....

(Emphasis added.)

The fairness of a class settlement does not depend on the viability of different class members' claims:

only by engaging in the type of fact-intensive merits and choice-of-law analyses that we have rejected could a district court attempt to assay the varying strengths and weaknesses of asserted state claims. We can find no support in our case law for differentiating within a class based on the strength or weakness of the theories of recovery. Accordingly, we decline to require such an analysis.

According to the Supreme Court in Amchem, this statement is factually incorrect. The Third Circuit has in fact differentiated based on theories of recovery:

The Court of Appeals next found that "serious intra- class conflicts preclude[d] th[e] class from meeting the adequacy of representation requirement" of Rule 23(a)(4). Ibid. Adverting to, but not resolving charges of attorney conflict of interests, the Third Circuit addressed the question whether the named plaintiffs could adequately advance the interests of all class members. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the District Court was certainly correct to this extent: "'[T]he members of the class are united in seeking the maximum possible recovery for their asbestos-related claims.' " Ibid. (quoting 157 F.R.D., at 317). "But the settlement does more than simply provide a general recovery fund," the Court of Appeals immediately added; "[r]ather, it makes important judgments on how recovery is to be allocated among different kinds of plaintiffs, decisions that necessarily favor some claimants over
others."
83 F.3d, at 630.

In short, it appears that the en banc opinion did not consider much of the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issues facing it.  

Many of these strange statements make a lot more sense if they are limited to either (1) specific kinds of antitrust cases, or (2) settlement-only classes. They're still debatable--Amchem, for example, dealt with a settlement-only class--but they at least have an underlying logic that a court might be reluctant to interfere with an agreement between parties. In fact, Judge Scirica's concurrence specifically spells out that this was a settlement-only class, and therefore would not face many of the manageability problems that plaintiffs might face were they to take the case to trial. The majority appeared to agree with this conclusion in at least one part of its opinion. When evaluating the fairness of the settlement, it explicitly stated that

although the size and variety of issues implicated in this nationwide class action do not present an obstacle to certification of a settlement class, there is a significant risk that such a class would create intractable management problems if it were to become a litigation class, and therefore be decertified. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that the considerable risk of maintaining the class action through trial weighed in favor of settlement.

(Internal quotations omitted.) And, in several places, it stressed the fact that this was an antitrust class action as well, and that antitrust cases are more susceptible to certification under certain circumstances.

Given the confusion sown by the majority opinion, the fact that many statements seem to contradict the Supreme Court's class-action jurisprudence, and the circuit splits this opinion opens, it would seem to be ripe for a certiorari petition. (Of course, it is always difficult to predict whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in cases like these.)

Meanwhile, given the en banc panel's sporadic attempts to limit the reach of its holding (however confusing in the context of the opinion itself), there are two strategies defense lawyers can employ when plaintiffs in the Third Circuit inevitably cite this opinion:

  1. Point out that the opinion is limited to settlements (and where appropriate, more specifically to antitrust settlements), and
  2. Quote the Supreme Court. In a contest between the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court, the Court wins. At least, it usually does.

(Thanks to Glenn Lammi for suggesting the first case of the year.)

Highlights from the ALI Principles of Aggregated Litigation Panel

 My apologies for posting late this week; I'm suffering from a little jet lag. I spent yesterday in Virginia at the annual conference for the American College of Court Business Judges, where John Beisner and I were presenting a number of developments in class action litigation.  Today I'm England, and by tonight, I will be in the Hague for the 5th Annual Conference on the Globalization of Class Actions and Mass Litigation, where Paul Karlsgodt (of ClassActionBlawg) and I will be eagerly taking notes.  

Before John and I presented on Monday, we were treated to a panel discussing the ALI's recently-finalized Principles of the Law of Aggregated Litigation. Victor Schwartz (long hailed as the "intellectual guru of the wrongdoers of America") moderated, and Professors Troy McKenzie and Charles Silver, and the Hon. William Highberger, discussed the development of the Principles. Among the highlights:

 

  • The ALI Principles have featured in several prominent class-action opinions in the past year, including Smith v. Bayer Corp. in the Supreme Court, and Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co. in the Third Circuit.
  • While Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes did not explicitly cite the Principles, it relied heavily on the late Richard Nagareda's work on divisible and indivisible remedies and the nature of common questions, as did the Principles.
  • The Principles have proven to be more stringent about cy pres relief than much of the case law, which may have influenced the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in their recent restrictions of when cy pres may be used.
  • The evolution of the Principles through its draft forms reflect a desire to minimize gamesmanship, including the removal of a number of examples discussing medical monitoring (which often does not lend itself to class treatment), a de-emphasis of subclasses to prevent any gamesmanship in class proposals (by, say, proposing a massive class, but having a subclass as a fallback position), and the deletion of a discussion of using a company's principal place of manufacture in conflict-of-law analysis (because conflicts of law involves substantive--rather than procedural--questions).
  • Certain of the Principles endorse changes in the law, rather than just restating it. Most notably, §§ 2.10 (which recommends allowing opt-ins where possible, or "aggregation by consent), and 3.17 (which would allow plaintiffs to give informed "advance consent" to settlement agreements, facilitating mass tort settlements).

Overall, the Principles are still new enough that most lawyers don't cite them very frequently when briefing mass or class actions. However, the judges in the audience seemed pretty enthusiastic about the analysis. Make of that what you will.

Given my travel and conference schedule this week, there'll be no post tomorrow.  But join me on Friday for the first set of highlights from the Globalization conference.  Safe travels to those who'll be there.  

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Andrew J. Trask

photo of Andrew J. Trask Andrew Trask has defended more than 100 class actions, involving all stages of the litigation process. While his work hasMore...

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